

[Translation Column: Into Psychoanalysis and Translation]

欄目主持人語(張可人〔本刊編輯,四川外國語大學博士生,成都精神分析中心成員〕):

一個「拓撲命題」 ——無意識像翻譯般結構

精神分析什麼?翻譯什麼?誰分析,誰譯?在詢問這些問題時,不妨嘗試問:什麼是精神分析?什麼是翻譯?分析誰?譯誰?這一問句遊戲揭露的正是一種「正一反」相互附著的拓撲邏輯。正即反,反即正。翻過去實則翻回來;去分析實則是分析自己;讀他人便是讀自己。正如齊澤克(Slavoj Žižek)在《享受你的症候》(*Enjoy Your Symptom!*)中指出的那樣,「在象徵層面,寄出去的信始終會到收信者處」。若要深挖這樣「至上則為至下;極目他者則為自視;翻譯即分析」的道理不妨從揭示了「主體矛盾性」,開創了「翻譯主體」的弗洛伊德(Sigmund Freud)讀開去。

在《夢的解析》(*Die Traumdeutung*)中,弗洛伊德為精神分析倫理定下了基調——藉由意識層面通常忽略的要素:口誤、幻聽、遺忘、雙關、詼諧等非常規語符現象來解讀分析者壓抑在無意識的欲望,從而讓其觸及自我的無意識結構,以至於「與過去無法逾越的自我和解」。從精神分析實踐的這一基本取向可看出,該學科的邏輯向度朝「內」而非「外」,始終圍繞一種「回溯性」邏輯從可被直觀的意識現象回歸空無的無意識混宇。這至少預設了,精神分析的對象是一種由能指鏈條纏繞的無(nothingness),一種無法靠邏輯拐杖輔助言說,難以由意識把握且實存於人心靈深處的「原初(primal)」狀態。無意識並非人們所懷疑的那樣,是一個觸不可及的神話或包納萬物的鐵桶。拉康稱,無意識以及症候像語言一樣結構。值得注意的是,無意識並非語言本身,而是語言構成的邏輯或標示「如何說」的話語。換言之,它不是速度,而是加速度。乘客可以明確靠儀錶刻度確定速度,但無法利用一種直觀明確錨定加速度。這也是為何,拉康理論體系不可繞過主人話語、癡症話語、分析師話語以及大學話語這標識如何言說的「四大話語」進行病例劃分。也正是這樣的語言邏輯讓沉澱於主體晦暗深處的無意識得以重複且越過審查機制的症候浮現。進而言之,話語本身便是闡釋學意義上「向未來敞開」的「端口」。這一主體「意識—無意識」相交的觸點,或是德勒茲意義上的「奇點」也成了「翻譯」的起點。

正如拉康所言,人一旦說話,語言便將人異化,因為我們始終在使用「他者的語言」,自始至終在向「大他者」借取符號進行言說。由此可見,在本雅明說出「譯者的債務」前,「人就已經在符號那裏欠下了永遠的債務」。拉康派代表布魯斯·芬克(Bruce Fink)亦稱「說即遺失(speaking entails loss)」。這恰恰與「詩意失於譯(poetry is what gets lost in translation)」異曲同工——真正「要被說的」往往遭受了「遮蔽」!這也是為什麼我們總困頓於「詞不達意(to say one word to mean another)」或是「完美翻譯之不可能(perfect translation is

impossible)」。真正的意義不在所指處,它始終在能指與所指的錯配中。這錯配的緣由便是能指的「多義性(polysemy)」。這一多義性本身則被利柯(Paul Ricoeur)借去,搭建了「文本多義—無意識多義」的闡釋學橋樑,讓無意識在文本呈現得以可能。深受精神分析師夫人影響的德裏達同樣說出「夢不可譯(what untranslatable are dreams)」,指明拋掉語言實在性後的「那個東西」不可譯出。那這一不可譯的「東西」便是「自我」本身。拋棄符號的翻譯亦在博爾赫斯《夢》一詩中盡顯無遺:「我將是眾人,或者誰也不是/我將是另一個人而不自知/那人瞅著另一個夢——我的不眠」。人在一種幻迷的心靈境地找到棲息的大地。這樣「尤裏卡」式的發現絕不是向外的探索——一種擴張式的演繹,而是一種回到自我本身的退行式歸納。基於本人的經驗碎片朝向本人無意識的回溯若以拓撲邏輯言說,亦是一種朝向未知的探索。探索的本質,不論方向,均是符號至符號,概念至概念,命題至命題的翻譯。

將物質性的語言向語言使用者處回歸的過程暴露出一個事實:實在(the Real)的「自我」始終處於「尚待翻譯」的狀態。它始終以一種轉喻的姿態嵌於能指鏈條中,所指始終沒被錨定,後者成了一個懸浮的、空泛的能指。也就是說,人類自出生起便在「翻譯」,他們重複性地在為懸浮的能指錨定一個意義。恰如拉普朗什所言,嬰兒成長於「對父母隱匿資訊(enigmatic message)的重複翻譯」。也正是出於主體的「翻譯結構」,精神分析師需要坐在「假設知道的主體(subject supposed to know)」的位置上以一種「譯者」的姿態對神經症以及性倒錯患者進行診療(與自閉症與精神病患者工作除外),並以「異化雙方」的語言作為手術刀,在矯正、引導、揭露分析者話語的過程中,以一種「使其驚訝」的邏輯切入分析者話語中的無意識欲望,成為分析者「欲望的原因而非對象」。這一診療範式,至少是拉康派的診療範式主要預設了三點。其一,如翻譯般的對話是精神分析實踐的基本邏輯。其二,分析者的任務在於通過自我的言語,特別是自我無法意識的各種「失誤」觸及自我的無意識。其三,分析師的功能在於欲望著分析者的欲望,成為一種「誘惑」分析者翻譯自身的原因,但在此過程中分析師也需要翻譯患者的言語。這至少確立了精神分析實踐的翻譯結構,是一種基於「移情—反移情(或稱轉移—反轉移)」的跨主體闡釋。闡釋的前提在於理解,在斯坦納(George Steiner)那裏,理解即翻譯。照此,精神分析的診療過程也可以冠之「信任—侵入—吸納—補償」這般翻譯闡釋派力挺的四環節。

可見,精神分析與翻譯在「闡釋」層面具備充分的同構關係。那麼翻譯是否必要與精神分析重合?翻譯的對象始終壓抑在構成原文的語符中,同樣涉及文字的起承轉合、修辭機關、文字遊戲,譯者往往比作偵探,面對模稜兩可之句久久不可抽身。翻譯實踐者也往往彰顯一種「強迫性重複」——起筆翻譯一部作品後,便沉溺其中,難以結束;甚者往往重複回溯譯文,驚歎自我譯筆,要麼悔恨交加,不斷叩問「我為何如此下筆?」照此而言,翻譯的對象僅是自我對「歷史上死去的作者」抑或「未來尚生的讀者」的「內攝(introjection)」,早已超越了簡單的文字、文化以及知識的跨域交流幻象。譯者利用譯語呈現出一個完整的Fort-Da結構前便已經預設了他在一個被讀者/作者以愛意凝視的位置。欲望始終先於語言,語言的後知後覺(Après-Coup)結構了翻譯欲望的原始驅力(Trieb)。還需注意的是,文字、文化以及知識層面的本地化或全球化通常後於自我化發生,即「我認為我傳播了含義」,「我認為我聯通了文化」,「我認為我生產了知識」。人類始終在自我的繭房中如納西索斯,面對清湖,孤芳自賞,想像著我被一個大寫的他享樂。這也是本人與芬克當面論及「譯者身份」時所達成的共識。既如此,「欲望即他者的欲望」,「求分析即自我分析」,「譯即自譯」,這正如拉普朗什意義上的翻譯——「一種建構性的自我闡釋」。因此,兩者在一種「自我闡釋」層面上達成了充要

條件。

若在雅各布遜(Roman Jakobson)的「翻譯三分法」進一步納入上述視野可知,對自我無意識的探索;分析師對他人無意識的關照;以及利用文字翻譯作為言說方式誘導無意識出現,均屬於一種「超語翻譯」——既存在亂碼般的符號(夢境、口誤、幻聽),也存在相關的語言解讀(分析師或分析者的解釋與疏導)。在此,何以讀「超」?精神分析工作的語言不僅是體系的、結構的、邏輯的、有序的,還存在非邏輯的、混沌的、抽象的、亂倫的符號。納入精神分析的翻譯,或是納入翻譯的精神分析必然是「腳踏兩只船」。「船」並非兩大學科,而是「經驗」與「超驗」;「意識」與「無意識」;「具象」與「抽象」等或隱或顯且以「人」為中心的「一體二面」。因此,「超」在於拓展了翻譯的所指,將「以語言結構的無意識」也一併納入。另外,超語翻譯不僅囊括了「三分法」中的「語內翻譯」「語際翻譯」以及「符際翻譯」,還由此拓展到了「人本身」的維度。原因在於,這三類基於「符號體系」的轉換必定以「非/超語言體系」作為底色或弗洛伊德的「神秘手寫板」進行。換言之,誤譯的存在為正譯提供條件;書寫的存在為被書寫提供條件。如是,可得一個基本結論:通常意義上「文字或符號翻譯」的底色在於具備更寬泛內涵的「人的翻譯」——涉及「自我認識」「文字轉換」「人格形成」「欲望投射」等等涉及心靈、人格、語言、轉換、直觀、本能等諸多面向。這也為翻譯過程補充了一種主體「內外兼得」的拓撲邏輯。

前文已提到,無意識或症候早已套上了語言的結構。因此,不論是語言—無意識,無意識—語言,欲望—行為,分析師無意識—分析者無意識,譯者無意識—譯本呈現,翻譯批評者無意識—研究論文等等結構對子都存在一種「翻譯的結構」。這也與 *Translation Studies* 主編皮奧特·布盧姆欽斯基(Piotr Blumczynski)《無處不在的翻譯》(*Ubiquitous Translation*)的主旨形成互文。或許,在人工智慧時代,我們討論語言轉換極具風險——拉康早已預言,「主體始終被語言捕獲」。與布盧姆欽斯基談及未來翻譯走向時,他也著重提到了「翻譯的轉換邏輯」。這一轉換絕非 A 到 B 的線性向度,而必然是 a 到 A 的躍遷螺旋。這一螺旋式的轉換不僅說明了「譯作是原文的來世」這一朝向未來的命題,同時也涵括了「分析是患者的歷史」這一回歸歷史的向度。或許,正是這一既前又後、既表又裏,且與「拓撲」同構的「轉換」正是韋努蒂(Lawrence Venuti)口中「(精神分析與翻譯研究)兩大百年學科融合」以及貝爾曼(Anthony Berman)「利用精神分析進行翻譯批評」的概念切口。在拉康「無意識的語言隱喻」基礎上更進一步提出「無意識的翻譯隱喻」正當其時。

無意識像翻譯般結構意在指出:無意識機制推動能指任意組合、人格生成以及症狀浮現的「符內翻譯」;精神分析診療過程中分析師與分析者的「符際翻譯」;主體在「實在界—想像界—象徵界」這一莫比烏斯環中遊蕩的「拓撲翻譯」,而這三大類「翻譯」均重複性地以「超語言的形式」嵌入雅各布遜的「翻譯三分法」中。只不過,「無意識符號」永遠沒有可被直觀的「語言符號」那樣直接,它總是以一種翻譯(或交換)的剩餘形式穿插於人類的語言表達中。這便需要翻譯/精神分析實踐者或研究者以回溯性邏輯「翻譯」語言符號中的無意識表徵,從而以他者身份聯通文本、患者、自我、作者等無意識的工作倫理。

在這一翻譯即精神分析,精神分析為翻譯的拓撲邏輯下,本期特設《精神分析與翻譯專欄》,主要圍繞「譯者無意識」「精神分析與翻譯話語融合」「精神分析邏輯的翻譯批評可能」進行深入討論。本期已體現「譯研結合,中外交流」的整體宗旨,既有相關經典研究論文的譯介,也有針對歷史文獻的理論對話;既有外國作者對該領域的貢獻,也刊載了中國學者對此領域的思考,體現了精神分析與翻譯研究的國際性、時效性以及系統性。

What's IN Difference? Between Translation and Psychoanalysis

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Received: March 14, 2024

Accepted: March 20, 2024

Published: June 30, 2024

This paper is supported by the Chongqing Graduate Research and Innovation Project “Dissemination of Translated Works by the Translation House of the Jiangnan Manufacturing Bureau” (Grant No. CYB23268) .

To cite this article: ZHANG Keren. (2024). What's IN Difference?: Between Translation and Psychoanalysis. *Asia-Pacific Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 4(2), 004–026, DOI: 10.53789/j.1653–0465.2024.0402.001

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.53789/j.1653–0465.2024.0402.001>

Abstract: Since Lawrence Venuti's work on the role of the “unconscious” that makes translation different (2002/2013), there seems to be an opportunity to apply psychoanalytic theories to understanding and/or counter-understanding what's IN the translation and translator. Increasing efforts have been put to either engage translators' “irrational choices” with the assistance of psychoanalysis or investigate the significance of various errors hidden in the process and product. However, the conceptual and logic connection between the two subjects remains unresolved. Given that, the article would take Venuti's work as a point of departure to research not only the insidious agendas in the process of translating but, maybe most importantly, how the two disciplines would emerge as a coherent whole for relevant studies to come. In an attempt to go from the previous description of subjects (translators/readers/analysts/analysands) to reach the prescriptive ground of “why to” and “how to”, the article will offer numerous concepts such as “difference”, “differences”, and “in” to clarify the foundational grounds for the dyadic subjects. To further expound the possibility of integrating the two, the author develops new terms like “hermeneutic practice” and “pre-transference” through psychoanalytic, hermeneutic, and phenomenological lenses. That may clarify some unsolvable issues left behind while working out an eligible path and premise for colleagues from both academic communities in the up-coming work.

Keywords: psychoanalysis; translation; multi-discipline; difference; transference

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Despite what may seem to be analogous linguistic and discursive structures between a source text and its translation, no similarity of form and meaning or of reception preexists the translating process. Any

such similarity is constructed on the basis of irreducible differences, which are always already present before the translating begins...

(Venuti 2008: 1–5)

1. Venuti's Differences and Beyond

Venuti's well-known work, "The Difference that Translation Makes: The Translator's Unconscious" (2002/2013), has a major contribution that is, at least here, not how psychoanalysis would go along with translation or vice versa, but the difference the scholar assumes could be accounted for as the REAL chance to explore the fundamental connection, i. e., the logic links between the two fields. *Difference here cannot be understood as differences*, as Venuti would have it. The article's underlying assumption is that difference is a link rather than a separation that can never be translated. In a narrowed sense, the difference is a chance for communication (including translation), i. e., you can never talk too much to a man who knows and says exactly the same as you, and in a broad sense, it means a chaotic state that has been, if any, in a phenomenologically relevant sense, pre-given before the communication, i. e. while we are talking (in a clear context), I retrospectively and surprisingly feel the possibility to talk about (the calling of the murky motivation that pre-exists in the conversation). If a further step should be taken, the difference in the following text is distinct from Venuti's plural one, a result still from a linguist and discursive perspective.

Following the thread, the article would not further on how the psychoanalytic field would elaborate on "what translation is" and "how translators work unconsciously" based on Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* (1899) or his idea found in articles like "The Uncanny" (1919) and "Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming" (1908) (see for example Mahony 1980, 2001, 2003, 2015; Bass 1985; Mehler et al. 1990). Neither will I follow "what translation would offer the understanding of subjects" within Lacanian language- or semiotics-oriented framework (see for example, Laplanche 1990; Benjamin 1992; Fletcher 1992), for the risk that the two communities will suffer disciplinary bias, which is a rather isolated path of translation-related research that is to serve the master discourse of psychoanalysis.

Still, I am not going to start with what is going on in the translation scholarly context. They are primarily concerned with the relationship in and out of the rendering process, as well as how translators, who make serial decisions (McEwan 1990; Kashkin 1998, O'Connell 2016), are driven by elements they are unaware of. That was the beginning of Dennis Porter's (1989) and Walter Benjamin's (2000) work on how to re-comprehend the act of translation by bringing something eerie outside the awareness. Susan Ingram (2001), Anne Quinney (2004), and Rosemary Arrojo (2018) developed a method for negotiating the two notions of translation and transference, as well as identifying the unseen interaction between various agents (most of whom are missing, such as author, reader, publisher, etc.) in translating.

Apparently, academia is, in some manner, splitting the two fields of study. The discipline of translation is

not concerned with the study of psychoanalysis, but rather, the latter would interpret translation as a means of disseminating their canons over the world (Birksted-Breen 2010). Translation experts are confined to a few generic phrases to support their current framework. The two are vying for their own say by borrowing another to reinstate their own original stance on “what is unconscious” and “how subjects become possible” like Laplanche’s (1997: 653) appropriation of “translation” in his general theory of seduction and enigmatic message (Tessier 2014: 169–170); or “what is left (out) in translation, i. e. remainder” and “who is the subject of translation” (Robinson 2001; Myskja 2013; Venuti 2017) with the use of psychoanalytic notions to offer explanations for what is beyond the rationality of translation heavily influenced by structuralism. Such opposing directions, i. e. , psychoanalysis’ departure and translation’s arrival on the surface of what’s behind the subject’s rational mind, would not, in my opinion, cause the entire split between the two, but would provide a perspective on what’s beneath the surface that compartmentalizes the two disciplines.

Meritxell Serrano Tristán (2014), who identified the potential for the two disciplines to integrate, provided an excellent overview of evaluations on researchers from both sides that have contributed to interdisciplinary study, ultimately arriving at the function of the unconscious in translation. The issue, therefore, arises: Is the unconscious the only key to the merging of the two disciplines? If this is the case, the unconscious, a deeply embedded Freudian idea, will permanently dominate translation studies. It would, therefore, create a predisposition among psychoanalytic theorists (always practitioners first) toward translation studies—most of whom are currently unaware that translation was created as a field in the 1970s by academics such as James Holmes (2000). On the other hand, if the unconscious can explain all the phenomena from the choice of source and target texts, relating to the author and power hierarchies (Tristán 2014: 83), the rather general and empty signifier of “unconscious” can be seen or appropriated as a “pre-text” (texts before produced that govern all factors relevant to producing translations) or a “pretext” (an excuse to avoid or minimize complexities in the process of translating).

Instead, if we attempt to translate between psychoanalysis and translation (particularly psychoanalysis and translation studies), we must withdraw from what they both concern, either ontologically or hermeneutically. That brings us back to Venuti’s essay, which was published in 2002. Venuti seemed to have a strong understanding of the fundamentals of both fields, as seen by his description of the “pre-existing” discrepancies before translators begin their work. Venuti’s cut-in point through “unconscious” still includes certain fall-backs.

Tellioglu (2023) argued that Venuti’s use of the phrase “unconscious” was not sufficiently radical since he still used terms like “working hypothesis,” “describe,” and “empirical evidence.” That is, the researcher is still limited to the widely recognized descriptive approach in the translation community to what is suppressed in translators’ decisions. Tellioglu proposes an interactive perspective on translations, arguing that internal and external elements (e. g. , semantics, wordplay, polysemes, political and cultural influences) in the translated text “converge and clash..... interact and mutually transform each other” (41) to bridge the gap between textual descriptivism and sub-textual analysis. However, she did not provide audiences with a way for psychoanalysis-based translation studies to eliminate the need for a basic exposition of the translated text’s complex and

constantly changing characteristics. It is, therefore, still an advocacy for a descriptive paradigm for the rather ideally fixed unconscious of translation. The only way to break free from the limitations of positivism and obtain legitimacy in integrating with what remains in psychoanalysis is to first identify a logical relationship between the two disciplines before making methodological suggestions. The idea of difference represents such a key crossroad.

If we return to the beginning, it is unavoidable to go through the philosophical understanding of “what’s difference,” “what makes difference,” or “what difference makes” before developing a link of “what’s in difference” for the later work on explaining the validity of the two disciplines of translation and psychoanalysis, which are primarily based on interpretation. Besides, interpreting itself is *by* and *for* the difference. Thus, if and only if we consider the ultimate task of the translator or psychoanalyst to be unraveling meaning through chains of signifiers (including rational or irrational ways to express, such as translators’ error or analyst’ counter-transference), the difference is and only is the starting point for merging the two. What’s *beyond* Venuti’s attempt to introduce the unconscious of docking translation studies with psychoanalysis is what’s *under* the very basic work of language.

2. What’s the Difference and Where is “IN”

2.1 *The dyad of identification and difference: Leibniz vs. Kant*

Difference is initially grasped in contrast to identity. Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz introduced “the identity of indiscernibles” or Leibniz’s Law in section 9 of *Discours de métaphysique* (1686/2017), which is considered the cornerstone of modern analytic philosophy. According to the concept, “several considerable paradoxes follow from this, amongst others that it is never true that two substances are entirely alike, differing only in being two rather than one” (Leibniz 2017: 5). Forrest (1996/2010) defines such a law as $\forall F (Fx \leftrightarrow Fy) \rightarrow x = y$. If and only if x and y share the same attribute F , they are identical. Clear as it might be, the law is the definition of what’s the same, and the difference lies in the un-identical F . Therefore, if difference is to be accounted for, the property is the core to debate upon.

The property is later under critique. One of the most famous critiques is found in Immanuel Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781), in which he discusses the purity of property. Kant maintained that the difficulty is that we must distinguish between the object itself and its presentation, even if their qualities differ. According to his perspective, further distinguishing between identity and difference is the “proper business of understanding” (Kant 1781/1855: 191). He then went on to use the case of “two drops of water” to refute the completeness of Leibniz’s law on the same property by stating that “in the case of two drops of water, we may make complete abstraction of all internal difference (quality and quantity), and, the fact that they are intuited at the same time in different places, is sufficient to justify us in holding them to be numerically different” (ibid.). This demonstrates that Leibniz’s quality, according to Kant, should not be considered transcendental and pure. The two

philosophers' distinction is based on the object or phenomenon, the effect of objects, and the objective of people's pure knowledge. The facts, i. e. , the two droplets of water, are, in Leibniz's framework, *intelligibilia* (things of pure understanding), and Kant claimed that if this is the essential premise, his law of identity of indiscernibles operates. However, if the items are targets of senses, they should be perceived empirically, that is, in a real place and impacted by some external and invisible processes. Kant believed that reality should not be defined by Leibniz's concept of \forall (universal quantification). If such is the case, then it follows that the "opposition between realities is incogitable" (ibid.) in which "the pure object is internal which has no relation (as regards its existence) to anything different from itself..... nothing but relations." (ibid. , 192) I may summarize Kant's critique of Leibniz's law as the difference in our reality. Although two drops of water are physically and qualitatively identical, two persons who experience them in separate locations but at the same moment may perceive them differently. If a guy sees a drop of water falling from the ceiling in the bathroom, he may interpret it as an indication of a plumbing issue; yet, if the same drop of water falls from a faucet, the other man may conclude that the tap is functioning well because there is still a water supply. Kant's argument is the first step forward from the difference to identity, which differs from the vice versa by Leibniz, who, together with René Descartes (see for example *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia*, 1641), was voicing for the divinity, the ultimate identity or the One, with the help of mathematics and logics.

If three phrases are used here to distinguish between the notions of difference at the crossroads of Leibniz and Kant, they would be recorded as follows.

(1) Difference is still an ontological idea, but the former avoided it while leaving a place for God, the ultimate identity, whereas the latter made room for the external world and humans. (2) As a result, difference is ramified into differences. The former represents the metaphysical and transcendental concept of understanding, regardless of real and multiple factors; the latter, the physical and sensible concept of understanding, accepting both something beyond physics, i. e. , understanding, and within the world, such as numbers, space, and time^[1], events, etc. The conflict between the two philosophers is about the distinction between isolated differences and differences in relations. (3) The former refuses further development of his rule since it leads to paradoxes that require endless empirical study because religion profoundly and conservatively forbids possibilities or undetectable discrepancies. The latter acknowledges the fundamental equations that explain how two ideas are identical but goes a step further to uncover concepts in our physical world. It is somehow about demystifying the holy difference that exists between God, the pure notion, and the actual tangible distinctions that those individuals experience as a result of the various circumstances in which they live.

2.2 *Between difference and differences: A silence maker in translation and psychoanalysis*

Based on the preceding part, I would give syllogistic reasons for the ontological and empirical contrasts

[1] Although Kant made such an example of two drops of water in different places at the same time to clarify the difference of the same amount of thing of the same quality across space at the same time, he might also acknowledge the fact that the same amount of thing of the same quality is different across time at the same place, i. e. the two pieces of leaves on the same place of a tree are different in seasons.

between the activity of translating and psychoanalysis.

- a. Leibniz's universal difference is the foundation of pure understanding.
- b. Pure understanding^[1] is the basis or equivalent of translation (Steiner 1998) and psychoanalysis (Freud 1925).
- c. Universal difference is the basis or equivalent of translation and psychoanalysis.

The other hunch goes that:

- a. Kant's differences considering the reality is the foundation of the different understandings involving relations and where relations happen, i. e. , the world or context.

- b. Relations and contexts are the basis or equivalent of translation (Pym 1992; Fawcett 1995; House 2006; Simeoni 2007; Appiah 2021) and psychoanalysis (Greenberg 1983; Ogden 1983; Mitchell 1988; Kernberg 1995; Hornstein 2002; Orange 2006; Stolorow 2011; Henry 2020).

- c. Differences considering the reality is the basis or equivalent of translation and psychoanalysis.

When the two sets of arguments above are examined in depth, it becomes clear that both translation and psychoanalysis exist somewhere between the "pure" and the "real," which is also true for any communication and even ways of being. As psychoanalysts or interpreters, they go from transcendental to actual distinctions, or vice versa. They either try to represent the author's or the patient's meaning through the words of the original texts or speeches, i. e. , the translator/psychoanalyst presupposes a goal to pursue with the help of their art of words; or use language first to portray the meaning in the process, i. e. the translator/psychoanalyst gradually follows what has already been said or written.

The dilemma is that neither translators nor psychoanalysts can get to the extremes of pure differences or actual differences. They would not adopt alternative ways based on reality since adoption assumes a predetermined but unreachable aim. Neither would they always employ the same set of techniques because adhering to the established norms excludes the ever-changing environment. To shortly conclude here, in every wordy and worldly practice, there is always a pure difference that does not govern but diffuses, and it is an inevitable paradox: The purity is always a lack, i. e. , it is always between actual differences of sound and word; object and language; subject A and subject B, etc. Only the lack-in-the-purity, always represented and revealed through languages like Venuti's citation of "remainder" by Jean-Jacques Lecercle (1990), demonstrates the existence of purity. Methodologically, translation and psychoanalysis studies can never be extreme by limiting the differences to either a set purpose or fixed language transfer. This indicates that the pure and real are calibrating at the same time, denying either side's focus. A graphic is intended to clarify my suggestion.

D is the pure difference, and d1–dn are real differences, with the former infinitely extending like the vectors

[1] Pure understanding is the concept that suspends all other possibilities. In translation and psychoanalysis, it is and only is the understanding of the meaning itself by both the translator and the analyst. The obvious risk here is relativism, which would later lead our thought on interpretation. I would also argue that the origin of hermeneutics is pure understanding, and George Steiner's basic claim that translation is understanding should be thus, at least here, amended as "all human-related activities are different understandings", but what's the same is the pure understanding that holds good of all mankind. In such a sense, translated texts are various understandings, yet it is the pure understanding that translation (including the practice, text, job, discipline, logic, etc.) should be equivalent to.




Figure 1 Graphic of difference and differences

in the graph, and the curve indicating that such an extension is not permanently structured as structuralists would acknowledge but is always in motion and gliding around the critical point of change. The curve line is built to represent a probable occurrence involving translation or psychoanalysis activities. Consider the Deleuzian “singularity,” an event that substitutes generality yet “includes the effectuation of the event into form.” (Borum 2017: 95)

The relationship between D and d1–dn occurs when the circle moves from larger to smaller in a retroactive manner. The circle represents what Hans-Georg Gadamer (1997: 469) calls the “finite possibilities of the word.” However, what Gadamer would overlook in his explanation are the infinite levels of the circle of the word since he only then asserted that “(the finite possibilities) are oriented toward the sense indented *as* toward the infinite.” (ibid.) His circle of signification is only a general layer, and infinity is merely people’s fancy-like daydream, i. e., what’s dead or blank in the giant circle. This would exclude the endlessly conceivable layers that grasp and re-comprehend each other all the way to D’s empty but functional core.

I propose that translation and psychoanalysis are exactly functioning as the graphic shows, which is a step further from Gadamer’s vision of the hermeneutic circle. Before proceeding with the argument, it should be noted that both word games differ from common communication since our general communications in our living-world are less sensitive to the abstract core of difference than to distinctions in life experiences. The difference (D) is quiet, like a black hole that swallows all human experiences, and the only way to convey and illustrate D is through interaction. A simple example is then provided to distinguish between D and discursive differences (d1–dn). It is regarded as awkward if someone keeps silent during the conversation since his partner will perceive that the two have no experience to share in that particular setting, resulting in the conversation’s non-existence. However, both translation and psychoanalysis allow for the presence of D’s empty core, which is largely represented as a “talking silence”, a phonetically silent scene but a hermeneutically functioning event.

In the field of psychoanalysis, Aleksandar Dimitrijević and Michael B. Buchholz (2021) edited the volume *Silence and Silencing in Psychoanalysis: Cultural, Clinical, and Research Perspectives*, whose 17 articles commonly accounted for silence as a (super) natural phenomenon particular to human (29 – 30); and manifestation of resistance, condition of listening, and potential transitional objects (87–88). The translation

community is also gradually welcoming the line of post-structuralist views to validate silence in the practice. Scholars like Shoshana Felman (1999: 103) discovered the untranslatable silence in “Walter Benjamin’s failed translation of Hölderlin, with the intention of representing the history of the voiceless history,” Roger Pearson (2004) discovered Mallarmé’s “translating silence,” and Natália Luiza (2022) found Beckett’s translation of complexity into simplicity in a “fidelity-to-failure” logic. Besides, Gideon Toury’s acceptance of assumed translation (1995: 32), Theo Hermans’ (1996) advocacy of the translator’s voice in narrative translations, and Klaus Kaindl’s multimodal typology of translation (2019) reveal changes between versions rather than what they actually are all present a possibility of the silent palette for translators to paint on in different settings.

2.3 *Translation’s poésie, invisibility, and IN (Imaginary-Symbolic or vice versa)*

Given the above diagram, the d1–dn chain is never static: It infinitesimally and spirally approaches the difference (D), which I would refer to as a dynamic regression, but not necessarily in a psychoanalytic sense, i. e., the defense mechanism to reverse the ego to earlier psycho-sexual development stages due to external or internal affliction or conflicts (see, for example, Freud 1900, 1905, 1913). It is comparable to the mathematical remainder, but it differs from the same verbal term that Venuti acquired. This indicates that we cannot actualize the infinite, say Lacanian floating signifier, through the material chain of signifier (language that makes temporal sense^[1]), since the finite possibilities of words paradoxically drive the user of languages to proactively rather than passively wield the systemic stick to get the unreachable shadow of difference. Such retrospective discursive movement is not horizontal but spiral. Think of Derrida’s *poésie*.

The materiality of a word cannot be translated or carried over into another language. Materiality is precisely that which translation relinquishes. To relinquish materiality: such is the driving force of translation. And when that materiality is reinstated, translation becomes poetry. In this sense, since the materiality of the signifier constitutes the idiom of every dream scene, dreams are untranslatable. (Derrida 1978: 210, cf. Venuti 2013: 34)

Here, I’d want to bring out some of Venuti’s misconceptions of Derrida’s statements and go a step further. Venuti used the term “poetry” or *ποίησις* (poiesis) to describe the creative process of translation. He saw translating as a form of poetic creation, similar to creating. That is what I agree upon. Yet, he subsequently stated that “translation creates another signifying chain accompanied by intra-textual effects and inter-textual relations that are designed to reproduce the source text.” (Venuti 2013: 35) His argument leads to the implicature that translating is inside or out of the text and culture (if it is also taken as a text), which are still

[1] The use of the word “temporal” means the chain of signifier is never fixed to a particular signified, and the conversation is only possible at once for all the talkers are temporally involved in their conversation here-and-now. That could be backed up by a simple example: One writes what flashes through his mind at the certain point he moves the finger, after which he knows what he wrote by the assistance of the word he typed down just now (think of Bernard Stiegler’s tertiary retention), but he can never get to the real history but get *by* it with the help of the signifier/word. This is also the basic logic of the article when bridging the gap between translation and psychoanalysis, i. e. retrospection.

trapped on the surface of chains of differences. Therefore, I would propose that, although the visible materiality (the words, sentences, paragraphs, and texts) creatively vanished during the process of translating, via the translator's creativity and flexibility, the difference (D) is infinitesimally approached like "a dog chasing his own tail," and the distance between the finite creativity in differences and the infinite difference lies the *poésie*. That's where translation fails, and thus, Derrida dubbed it as the untranslatable dream.

Besides, Venuti's "ethics of difference" is to call translators to resist "how power influences what is considered the proper meaning and its 'correct' translation and silences the alternate versions." (Wyke 2010: 114) This is his understanding of the difference in the socio-political-ethical planes of translators, and such a call for translators' visibility still overlooks a basic fact and general assumption that every subject (including translators) is visible, and what's invisible is the innate, blurred and topological demarcations among the Lacanian Real, Imaginary and Symbolic. As a result, his call for translators to stand out is still focused on the lexical-graphical phase of creating "foreignized expression in the translated text" and ignores some translators' desire to remain silent. Venuti's "ethics of difference" should be, therefore, replaced with the "ethics of differences" that regulate translators' language usage, regardless of where she/he is. On the other hand, the "ethics of difference" requires every translator to recognize the distance among the three Lacanian spaces within him/herself that are developed from the beginning of life. Particularly, a translator should attempt to touch and feel his/her Real, a chaotic state that projects one's wish, and understand such a space within the subject is always functioning. This also calls upon translators to never step back from their unconscious desire, which is stored at the Real. Still, we should also be aware that the act of translating occurs in the gap between chains of signifier (differences) and a smooth surface that is quiet but ready to provide interpretive options (difference). Consider dreams in which individuals are caught between differences (pictures, words, signs, scenes, etc.) and differences (desire, anxiety, terror, melancholy, disillusionment), which is analogous to the relationship between visibility and invisibility.

Unfortunately, Venuti (1995/2017) only emphasized the invisibility of translators in his perhaps most recognized book titled as such against the backdrop of the so-called "English Dominance". Suppose we combine Venuti's insights on the linguistic remainder in the translating process and the translator's invisibility, we can arrive at a more fundamental space regarding translation and psychoanalysis, the one IN-between linguistic differences and ontological differences. If we depart from here, I would say that what is between the two components is the linguistic representation and what is ontologically represented, which is structured like $I \rightarrow N$: I (Lacan's imaginary) to N (Gadamer's infinite).

As previously said, the process is never static since the subject's transition from the imaginary (the mirror stage) to the symbolic (the post-Oedipal stage) generates the remnant beyond words, i. e., the *objet a*, the undefined object ready to be selected as the object of one's desire. The simplest example of *objet a* is what's between what has been stated and what is meant to be uttered. It is worth noting that *a* here indicates the difference, the sign of the unconscious, which, according to Lacan, is structured like a language. As a result, the presence of *objet a* is a clear demonstration that the difference beyond words (the language law) drives the

structuring of various words to generate what's termed differences. Chances are that both psychoanalysis and translation are looking for a result of such a "difference-differences" circle: What's left and repressed in the structuring of the process, i. e., analysts want to know what it means given the patient's discourse, and translators want to know the structure of the author's language. Given that, both translators and analysts would start from an imaginary field (I) as to "I think the author/patient wants to express as such" to a stage of discursive movement (N): "I will talk/write on to approach the supposed meaning of the author/patient."

Besides, the I-N structure can also be reversed into N-I in a topological view because both analysts and translators begin with an infinite number of words: They work with real languages (texts, speech, tapes, etc.) before retrospectively using the act of analyzing or translating as a mirror for their imaginary, where they think they have found the cause or the meaning. The retroactive process at least guides their endeavor to get to the heart of the language distinctions, i. e., the difference, even if it comes at the expense of unavoidable repression. Regardless of the process's domed failure, the act itself demonstrates not only the existence of the unattainable difference (at least through words); but also, the essence of both language practices: They are both producing within the matrix interwoven by the moving chains of signifier (differences) with the first and driving signifier (difference) as the core, i. e. the first cause of the visible chains of signifier.

Therefore, to answer the answer "where is IN", one should be aware of (1) the simple hermeneutic model of two language practices of translation and psychoanalysis; (2) the difference-differences dialectics that involves both the changeable nature between the actual words and what drives the flow of words; (3) the distance (which can also be named as stage, room, or event) between the actor of words (translator and analyst) and what they can feel but are unable to express, the limit or breaking point of translating and analyzing. To summarize, IN represents a hazy condition that happens throughout or even before the practice of translating and analyzing. It also signifies the working process of the two activities of translating and analyzing, i. e., from the imaginary (I) to infinite words (N) like analysts or translators' role as the "supposed-to-know"; and vice versa, like free talking to demarcate a meaning scope before offering the possible imaginary field for their patients and/or readers.

3. Two Ends Dangling on the Pole: Two Subjects of Interpretation

3.1 Translation and psychoanalysis as language games

Scholars always focus on the language between something (meaning in translation and symptoms in psychoanalysis) in the two contexts, less critically following Freud's (1917/1966: 41) observation that "nothing takes place in psychoanalytic treatment but an interchange of words between patient and analyst." However, they are unable to go further into the relationship between the difference (the only purpose of activities) and the differences (personal, lexicographical, cultural, and social gaps) that are incorporated but difficult to observe, if in a descriptive manner, in the two activities described above. The relationship here is similar to Marx's surplus

value, which is what remains after the exchange of commodities (words in psychoanalytic and translation contexts). As an abstruse and abstract relation, such a relation of difference can still be discovered from the act of psychoanalytic treatment and translating processes.

Although he had a conviction for language, especially in relation to patients, Freud is an example that gives priority to such a relation. He (Freud 1912/2001: 115) suspended the visibility of psychoanalysts by recommending that “(he should) put aside all his feelings, even his human sympathy, and concentrates his mental forces on the single aim of performing the operation as skillfully as possible.” Besides, the analyst should be relatively anonymous to the patient (117–118) for the transference phenomenon, and ought to “sit behind the patient” with a limited amount of talk (Freud 1913/1966: 124, 133–134). The French speaker of Freud, Jacques Lacan (1997: 291), with a basic stance that Freud is humanitarian yet not progressive, went further to argue that “psychoanalysts must, if they take such a role, pay two things at once, i. e. , words and judgement. He ethically has to interpret the patient in a transference setting, even though that comes with the misrecognition or *méconnaissance* of the analyst. On the other hand, he also has to judge his actions, because “analysis is nothing but a judgement” (ibid.). The judgement itself is based on the analyst’s awareness that he cannot know all, or he is not even able to locate what he is doing through the analysis. The practical ethics offered underpins the existence of the pure difference but through the real differences found in word exchange. Therefore, the pure difference is unattainable but necessary in the psychoanalytic treatment: It is always IN the diffusion of differences, in reality, revealed through the wording of analysts and analysands. Such a line of thought could be further boiled down in Lacan’s remark on anamorphosis:

Thus, as I say, the interest of anamorphosis is described as a turning point when the artist completely reverses the use of that illusion of space, when he forces it to enter into the original goal, that is to transform it into the support of the hidden reality — it being understood that, to a certain extent, a work of art always involves encircling the Thing (141).

Lacan, above, used a clever metaphor (anamorphosis) to describe the chain of signifiers (words) and what is concealed beneath the structure. What I seek to do here is to explain why, in a cherished illusion of space, the work of art is turned into a support for the hidden reality, the Thing, or *Das Ding* in Heideggerian terms. Following the Lacanian viewpoint, I would argue that the Thing, an imageless and organless body, is never immobile, stationed, morbid, or unmoving, but rather the initial bank or prerequisite of a rhizomatic structure. Thus, it has the ability to be dynamic, flowing, moving, and flourishing. Such a body is to, according to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s (1983: 8) argument, “resist linked, connected, and interrupted flows (of the structured logical framework), and it sets up a counter-flow of amorphous, undifferentiated fluid.” The proof is also evident that, the ontological-existential structure of Martin Heidegger’s very basic concept *Dasein* is composed of three terms referring to the process or motion: thrownness (*Geworfenheit*), projection (*Entwurf*), and engagement (*Sein-bei*), and the three are inextricably encircling discourse (*Rede*) which is the deepest core

of language use (Emad 2007: 189). If, in Lacan's view, only the statement that "the transformable words in psychoanalytic practice" is enough to prove the existence of the unmovable Thing, I do not see the argument is entirely safe since *Dasein* (patients, artists, translators, etc.) themselves, instead of words, are encircling the *Rede*. The problem is what drives the transformation of words to come out of patients' mouths or of strokes by the hands of the artist? As a result, we should find the "how" or the "primal drive" that exists in the pure difference itself, and the "how" or fluid of the pure difference reveals itself through the alteration of language in the user's lexicographical, semantic, and syntactic structures. In other words, the anamorphosis needs a cause and the cause itself becomes the proof of the pure difference. We can clearly see the trend of the psychoanalyst's invisibility as he attempts to sit at the position of or bear the load of the pure difference, i. e., in a Freudian or Lacanian sense, he is the empty talking cure machine or a mirror against the back of the patient, interpreting the latter's desires. The visual absence of the analyst also reflects that psychoanalysis underlies, at least in conventional treatment modalities, the sheer difference in communication, i. e., the form of the dyad's word exchange in lieu of the content.

Translation, too, deals with languages without any doubts. Many translation scholars were interested in comparative, structuralist, historical, and social linguistics, or discourse studies and pragmatics^[1]. Even after James Holmes' declaration and vision of Translation Studies (TS) early in the 1970s, scholars from multiple perspectives, such as comparative literature, cultural studies, postcolonial studies, deconstructionism, gender studies, sociological communities, cognitive and computer science, began entering the field of translation studies, but they could never avoid, directly or indirectly, languages. They conduct their research using (para/multi-modal) texts (they would tend to describe the regularities of translated texts or predict what type of text translators/interpreters would produce), and the only slight difference after the introduction of Holmes' structure is the shifting of the center of study from texts to people and their relationships. The sociological perspective offered by Holmes and later publications, such as "The Name and Nature of Translator Studies" (Chesterman, 2009), would well serve the purpose. However, no matter how thoroughly our translation academics reform (for the time being, multi-perspectives have been seen in the field), there is still a lack of understanding of what translation is all about, or what lies underneath the many languages during and after the translation process. That requires us to clarify that the signifier discovered by the linguistic school of translation studies is not the same as those discovered by psychoanalysts, particularly the Lacanian school, despite the fact that what the former investigates is similar to the concept of Lacan's anamorphosis, C. G. Jung's symbols of transformation, W.

[1] Peter Fawcett published a monograph titled *Translation and Language: Linguistic Theories Explained* (1997/2014), in which the author introduced and explained language-related translation studies and approaches. Scholars like John Catford, Jean Delisle, Peter Newmark, Eugene Nida, Koller, Werner, Ernst-August Gutt, Hans Hömig, Paul Kussmaul, Mona Baker, Christiane Nord who approached translation essence, strategies, process with the help of linguistic theories have mentioned. What is worth mentioning is in the concluding remarks for psycho-linguistic method (also the last section of his book) to translation, Fawcett cited Antoine Berman's (1989) discourses addressing translation, namely (1) objective sectorial (a single perspective to translation like linguistics), (2) objective general (translation as an object of general discourse like hermeneutics), and (3) experiential (translation is intertwined with philosophy or psychoanalysis). Fawcett (1999/2014: 144) therefore criticized scholars with single perspective to translation for their lack of real interest in translation and encouraged a mixed but abstract way like Berman's third proposal to go further and more specific in the realm of translation studies.

Bion's Transformations in/of O, or Freud's translation of infant psychic phases, i. e. , all about the logic of change. Three particular points regarding the differences between the two disciplines are made here.

(1) Languages in translation serve simply as the object for specific communication tasks, such as message transmission; psychoanalysis uses signifiers to locate the subject, such as where the subject is.

(2) Translation studies seek a predicative goal, namely, to discover the law and features of translation (which is impossible due to changes in subjective and external factors), whereas psychoanalysis theories seek to borrow the structure of signifier-signified to make abstract psychical states accessible.

(3) Languages are what translators acquire in the practice, like new names created based on the foreign text, but psychoanalysts tend to forsake the signifier of their patients because signifiers are just a medium to or translation of the symptom (Lacan would abruptly stop the treatment when his patient realized something from his own free association^[1]).

I believe that the distinction above indicates the relationship between the two disciplines, which may also be viewed as an invisible "line" or Edmund Husserl's intentionality that connects the two. If we have to boil their relationship down into a sentence, it would be the one between "Ontological Difference" and "Empirical Differences" in their respective practices and ethos that are thoroughly discussed in previous sectors. Nonetheless, there are also certain details that need to be refined.

3.2 Hermeneutic basis in translation and psychoanalysis

Even though there are differences in the use of language and signifiers from both communities, they, given their basis of signs (either language or signifier), have something in common, namely the hermeneutic nature. Therefore, hermeneutics can be widely found in translation studies and psychoanalysis.

F. D. E. Schleiermacher is seen as the father of modern hermeneutics, and his contribution to "move from the author to the reader, and vice versa" (cf. Wyke 2010: 112) makes perhaps the first ever distinction, or schizo (Zhang & Zhu 2023: 75) in translation theorization. Such a delineation marks the significant thought on "understanding" and "interpreting", the two fundamentals of hermeneutics in the process of translation, and later make the two studies unite. Later, Steiner (1975/1992: 10) put emphasis on subjectivity in addition to the grammatical and textual analysis in the hermeneutic circle by Schleiermacher, which make translation matter from both internal factors (thought, value, spirit, etc.) and external aspects (contrastive grammar, stylistics, or text analysis). Gadamer (1960) introduced the historical horizon into the field of translation, and translating, as the event mediating between the context previous and current, should create more comprehension since the "fusion of horizon" is dynamic. That not only diminishes the fixed intention of the author, but, even more radically, the historical context where the author created the text. That still applies to translators. It means the history of

[1] See for example in Lacan's biography, *Esquisse d'une vie, histoire d'un système de pensée* (1993), by Élisabeth Roudinesco.

translators, too, vanish if a re-translation or interpretation of a certain translated text, say translation criticism, happens, before new comprehension is gained and later produced through texts. If interpreting is comprehending, Fritz Paepcke (1986) further affirms the translatability by the quoting of hermeneutics that any text's message in the interpreter's mind can be conveyed in another language, whenever there is a fusion of horizons. However, the crisis for translation studies also ensues, since Paepcke's argument presupposes the only meaning regardless of words' incommensurability across languages. As Steiner (1975/1992: 367) would suggest, the ideal translation would be the full mimesis. Some later scholars have noticed such a trend that goes extreme and attempted to incorporate empiricism into the ideally lopsided hermeneutics-based translation studies. R. Stolze (2003) and Thiselton (2006) are among the most representative scholars who try to fix the idealized trend by borrowing the concept of background, situation, the distinction of text's meaning and what interpreter thinks, the predicative mode of the text, applied linguistics, etc. to ensure the "objectivity" of the line of hermeneutics as a "paradigm" for translation studies (Stolze 2010: 145–146).

It is well revealed here that translation is about how to understand, how to express, how to distinguish between the text and her/himself, and how to produce or re-produce hidden messages from/via texts. The same is found in psychoanalysis.

Compared to the translation community, psychoanalysis is more actively engaged in hermeneutics. There are scholars finding the path shared by the two lines of thoughts (Harney 1978; Steele 1979; Eagle 1986; Benvenuto 1991; Franke 1998; Friedman 2000; Loewenberg 2000; Cabestan 2014; Busacchi, Giuseppe & Colillas 2021), and some scholars from psychoanalysis field also try to counteract the involvement of hermeneutics such as Laplanche's (1996) proposal of "psychoanalysis as anti-hermeneutics" and Bruce Fink's (2013) "against understanding." Whatsoever, the two schools are always conjugating from the academic alliance of Freud, Lacan, and Paul Ricoeur. The major and perhaps most important similarity between the two schools may be first retrieved from Freud's remark at the very beginning of his *Interpretation of Dreams*:

In the pages that follow I shall bring forward proof that there is a psychological technique which makes it possible to interpret dreams and that, if that procedure is employed, every dream reveals itself as a psychical structure which has a meaning and which can be asserted at an assignable point in the mental activities of waking life. (Freud 1953: 35)

According to Freud's understanding of psychoanalytic treatment, it is both a "technique," a rather scientific style, in which a set of rules or rigid procedures are followed to operate directly on objects, and a "meaning de-cyphering," a rather hermeneutic manner, in which the interpreter (subject) is involved in both detaching and involving the meaning hidden in the object. Given the contradictory facts, some scholars still believe Freud's psychoanalysis is hermeneutics, "insomuch as it aims at understanding the intention (the one between the conscious and unconscious) of the other" (Franke 1998: 69), and it is never the phenomenological sense of the object (including meaning) of intention that is at one's conscious level (Byrne 2021: 17). Paul Ricoeur, a

hermeneuticist who used Freud's duplicity to define psychoanalysis, concluded that the duplicity of signals (signifier and signified, or using one word to signify another) should serve as the connecting point between the two sciences. He believed Freud's repression was not an instinctive concept, but rather a presentation of the unconscious mind, and that the unconscious had its own structure, similar to what is sought and offered regarding the author's intention by a lot of translation scholars. Ricoeur (1965: 475) asserted that desire is posited in and via symbolization. Simply put, since hermeneutics believes that "meaning" emerges when there is symbolic representation, Ricoeur applied this rule to the unconscious desire, broadening the scope of hermeneutics. Therefore, the unconscious, the "most remote part of one's psyche," might interpolate into the text created by the conscious mind. The same rule applies to translation. Lacan and his successor Julia Kristeva would undoubtedly agree, as their linguistic and semiotic backgrounds strongly reinforce Gadamer's hermeneutic motto, "being that can be understood is language." (See Franke 1998: 74) The thing to be understood is that Lacan and Kristeva's hermeneutics are concerned with the "translation" of the unseen structure of the mind. It indicates that, while we symbolically view people's minds as a text available for analysis, the structure of the mind, desire, and even the ego occurs before the symbolization. Consider Freud's classic description of the structure of obsessional neurosis using *Fort-Da*, an infantile action in which he tosses and tugs a reel to mimic his mother's presence and absence. That means, hermeneutics in psychoanalysis implies the "pre-" stage, a mumbling period of subjects. An analyst's goal is to return to the patient's faulty structure (involvement) via the pre-structured language form and to adjust the psychic state (detachment). Such a process is formed in joint directions, with the analyst's understanding and interpreting, and the patient's (un-)cooperative acting through the exchange of words. A valid treatment is based on understanding the remainder of the word exchange, such as Marx's "surplus value," which requires the analyst's subjective trust and interpretation, and is also very similar to Steiner's four-stage translation/interpretation process: Trust, Aggression, Incorporation, and Compensation. Based on the interpreter's subjective "involvement-detachment" circle, the very basic logic of both translation and analysis leads to the ethos of "Against-Understanding", a type of knowing that transcends simply the material text, and such a knowing is translatable given the similar ground that holds both the interpreter and the interpretee, which is a different stance from Derrida.

Both translations and psychoanalysis may converge under such a hermeneutic logic in that they work on material texts but end up deviating from the material for they seek for something beyond the objective meaning and commit themselves to producing changes with practitioners' historical horizons. I would go on to ask, "what is the condition or precondition of translation and psychoanalytic practice?"

3.3 Hermeneutic practice, in-betweenness, and the conversation between the two subjects

In response to the preceding question, I would classify both translating and psychoanalytic therapy as "hermeneutic practice," which means that the two activities take place in the space between differences, intuition, difference, and reason. That also represents the fundamental stance I uphold: The validity of in-

betweenness. That means a modifiable state or condition where two changing but interacting objects^[1] (it could be two talking people, disciplines, theories, etc.) integrate to produce more products and possibilities. The in-betweenness can be explained as both a condition and a prerequisite for the two objects to collaborate by bringing their “open-ended past” to the stage for better modification while excluding and repressing their “reclusive past” (or hermeneutic injustice) as the invisible drive to complete his own, well-founded, and new hermeneutic circle. So far, it is reasonable to conclude that the hermeneutic practice rejects divine intuition, as did traditional hermeneutics scholars, but prioritizes people and their own history, and firmly believes that the new comprehension is created by interpreters themselves, based on their experience, both past and stored; current and interactive, and through the ontological catalyst of in-betweenness. Figure 2 depicts a graphical representation of hermeneutic activities.




Figure 2 Graphic of hermeneutic practice dynamics

Obviously, once such a hermeneutic practice is created, the model may be used to explain the dynamics of both translation and psychoanalysis practice, as well as to serve the theoretical debate regarding the two professions. Some points are expounded upon here.

First, the histories of the two objects (e.g., author/translator, translator/reader, patient/analyst, translation studies/psychoanalysis studies) are predetermined and cannot be changed. This is because the paradigm is based on unconsciousness, which serves as a container for what the object cannot conceive of. For example, a translator theorist cannot claim to have an omniscient understanding of how translation studies are developed and will be developed, and such a phenomenon exemplifies a “collective unconscious” that is formed and shared by all participants in a certain community or activity. As a result, when two objects intend to establish a dialogue relation, as shown in the graph above, the precondition is their respective past rather than a history shared by all, because the latter is an organized and mostly written form of the past, implying the loss of what is

[1] The reason that objects in lieu of subjects are used is the article’s basic understanding that the very basic and first engagement between the two subjects is considered as the meeting of two objects, like people’s body. They are then fundamentally objects of understanding. Besides, such a logic of departure would benefit the further expounding of disciplinary dialogue, or what makes more multidisciplinary researches possible.

truly inscribed in their own past. It should be noted that the past in this context includes both known and forgotten events.

Second, possibilities imply the possible messages that may activate the conversation between the two objects, which is in-material. They can be, for example, the possible words to translate a culturally loaded concept in the original text; or the possible theme that an analyst and his/her patient would pursue during their treatment; or the possibility that two disciplines could be classified as the same.

Third, the open-ended experience presupposes at least two points: (1) the experience that the object is aware of or is able to sense, say a dream and/or aesthetic experience after reading a text; (2) the experience that is evoked in a specific context involving the two objects that are ready to interact, say, a sudden realization of a past trauma after the solicitation of the analyst, or a sudden inspiration to translate an expression in a way the translator sees fit.

Fourth, possible differences include real and changeable word use when the two objects are engaged. If the two objects are texts, the word usage might be attributed to a scholar or critic who acts as a speaker for the two items and has the potential for discussion. This approach may also be used to argue the importance of comparative literature and translation criticism.

Finally, I believe the most significant aspect of the formula is “in-betweenness or difference,” which allows for possibilities, open-ended experiences, potential differences, and so on. The Lacanian *objet* serves as proof and/or drive for the presence of desire, and similarly, in-betweenness serves as proof and/or drive for interaction and discourse. As a result, translating and psychoanalytic practice are only feasible on the in-betweenness, which exists in all forms of dyads involved in the hermeneutic practice. The occurrence of such an in-between (difference) results in genuine language differences, such as distinct translation versions or alternative methods to convey and understand symptoms. Translation and psychoanalysis are also similar professions in that they both aim to work around the in-between. Given this, the two disciplines should be viewed as a dyad in the counselling session. They are, therefore, akin to subjects rather than disciplines in that they interpret objects or even each other (for example, an analyst interpreting the patient and the latter’s identification or resistance to the former) instead of things being interpreted. To summarize, the two subjects are always dangling on the pole between differences/differences, interpretation/understanding, rationality/passion, and striving to use the infinite number of words (differences) to gain or comprehend the finite existence or meaning (difference). When the debate reaches this point, the last issue may arise: How is it conceivable to be in-between or the difference?

4. Pre-Transference: A State into the Future

The idea of “pre-transference,” or the cause of the discourse, provides the solution to the aforementioned issue. Before delving into the topic, it is vital to understand the notion of “transference.” Freud’s examination of the Dora case revealed and expanded on transference or counter-transference (Jennings 2022). He claimed that “transference is not only the projection of an image of the past by the patient onto the analyst (Freud 1888;

Breuer & Freud 1895), but the visitor also empathizes by making use of some of the analyst's characteristics as well as of real situations present in the environment." (Freud 1905/1963: 107) Such a definition validates his tendency to place transference between the unconscious and the conscious (Levy & Scala 2012: 392). The dissolution of transference by both parties in the treatment means that the patient's neurosis is cured. Melanie Klein built the concept on Freud by stating that "the visitor can pressurize the analyst through interpersonal relationships to take on the characteristics of the original source of the visitor's transference." (see Steiner 2008) Furthermore, in Klein's view, the visitor may provoke the analyst to behave in a certain way at a certain moment, and such behavior is counter-transference on the part of the analyst (Balint & Balint 1939; Heimann 1949; Little 1951; Reich 1960). Based on this foundation, successors continue to develop the notion of transference. However, the development has centered on the behavior of the therapist motivated by the patient, or the effect that the therapist's behavior has on the visitor (Macalpine 1950; Wachtel 1980; Gill & Hoffman 1982; McLaughlin 1987; Kernberg et al. 2005.) There have also been useful explorations of the reality precipitation of transference and aspects of authenticity as well as falsity (Langs 1973; Wachtel 1980).

The concept of transference in this article is consistent with Levy and others' (2009) assertion that "transference is a tendency." In this disposition, symbolic connections that are essential and formative to the subject, such as those with parents and siblings, might be consciously and/or unconsciously associated with other relationships. Such a term defines the reality and unreality of transference at the relational level, whether on the conscious or unconscious levels. Most significantly, scholars believe that transference is a symbol that exists between the two poles of the conscious and unconscious. It is possible to define such a symbol as the visitor's transfer of his or her past ties with others to the analyst through a combination of conscious and/or unconscious motivation. It is important to note that this symbol represents the connection itself, rather than an "object" or "element" that appears within the topic. Only after the relation has become archetypal can the subject appropriate, restructure, relocate, and project it in order to produce a constitutive "symbolic relation." The previous scholars' contribution is to represent the relationship itself as the source of patient-analyst transference, rather than focusing on the patient's or analyst's projection or feedback, which appears to break the psychoanalytic community's "transference vs. counter-transference" dilemma, and their work is more than a good example of showing how the psychoanalytic community understands the relationship. However, the researchers have not explained "how" this symbolic relation of transference works. The "how" is what defines the "pre" condition.

The term "pre" is distinct from "*a priori*" in the first place. The latter implies a "thing" outside the purview of the subject, as well as the dominating function of this "thing" for the subject. The "pre" refers to the "possible relations" contained in the subject that connect it to others. This link is not that between connotation and denotation, but rather between the symbol and its possible meaning, or the dual nature of the signification. The sign exists in the objective world, but the meaning must be understood and filled in. As a result, symbolic intervention offers tangible discursive material for proving the "pre-transference" and establishes transference as evidence-based. In the specific diagnostic context, this "pre-transference" is symbolically erased during the

dialogue between the two parties; yet this “erasure” permits the pre-transference to stay, retrospectively, as a “relation”, in the field where the analyst and the patient are both open to alternative relationships. In other words, to represent or realize the pre-relationship/transference means to implicitly convey it rather than making it apparent. Such transference is clearly not related to language and occurs between the usage of linguistic representations by both the visitor and the analyst. To specify, as the analyst compares, interprets, revises, and diffuses the symbols supplied by the patient, or as they are exchanged, the pre-transference is symbolically erased but returns to the zone of possibilities that the mutual subject opens up to a future relationship.

Pre-transference becomes the precondition for the symbolic role of dreams to be captured and interpreted by the analyst. It is also the medium for associating the sticks, trunks, daggers, spears, and pistols of the visitor’s dream visions with the male genitalia; for combining the grooves, bottles, cans, crates, boxes, and hulls of ships with the female genitalia; and for generating the images of the body, of the parents, of the children, of the deaths, of the nudity, and so forth, with the given scenario and its inherent meanings. It can be argued that the “pre” indicates that the symbolism of the dream content is directed toward the analyst prior to interpretation; and “transference” denotes the projection of the analyst toward the other. It can be argued that transference is ambiguous either before or after language is used. What language shows in the present is a trace of the transference tendency, which still returns to the subject as part of the pre-transference, waiting for a future context that will allow it to pass through the process of “symbolization/realization-return to the other subject” once again.

Based on the view of the pre-transference, Freud advocated the grafting of the subject’s “inner-outer” symbolic system, i. e. , the “I-it” connection. “It” here refers to the link between “I” and “it (object)”. “It” is not the “I myself”, i. e. , the intra-personal structure of the subject’s personality, or the “otherness” promoted by the post-structuralists such as Emmanuel Levinas neither, but rather, it is a state-like difference high above that connects the internal elements of the subject (dream content) with the external symbols (language). Quoting from the structuralist linguist Émile Benveniste, I would also argue, in response to Freud’s concept of the signifier, that what psychoanalytic diagnosis and treatment aspires to find is not a “causal relationship (differences logic)” but a “motivational relationship (difference logic)” that causes mental problems. This shows that the aim of psychoanalytic work is to establish a mode of practice that connects, realizes, and anchors the visitor’s “motivational state” according to Freud. In this way, the object of hermeneutic practice using language thus shifts from the “true propositions” that philosophy aims at uncovering and the “false propositions” that it aspires an identification, to “discourse” itself. The “discourse” at this level is the “emptiness” or pre-transference mentioned earlier. That is to say, in Freud’s case, “discourse” does not only refer to “how to say at the linguistic level” or a “representation of power formed by a network of *énonciation*” in Foucault’s sense, but a kind of “real emptiness” (the modification of empty with real is intended to indicate that “empty” is different from “nothing”). It is a gesture that is actually in the position prior to the subject’s speech, as a “difference state” mentioned above).

Given this, the pre-transference is *a priori condition* in which the two objects face each other evenly and

begin any prospective discussions. The role it plays is reflective of the difference. That silently pushes translators to take on a role for a certain text, or analysts to sit in front of/behind their patient. Only under such conditions may variations in word exchange develop. In a nutshell, pre-transference is the primary cause of language connection, such as translators connecting writers and readers and analysts engaging in discourse with patients. It also refers to the mutual interpretations of two disciplines, such as studies of translation and psychoanalysis.

5. Concluding Remarks: Integrating after Tangling

Based on the aforementioned, I would reexamine Leibniz's concept, i. e. , $\forall F (Fx \leftrightarrow Fy) \rightarrow x=y$, and alter it to $\forall P (Fx \leftrightarrow Fy) \rightarrow x-y$ or $y-x$. That is, if and only if there is a pre-transference (P) as the pre-given field for x y, and x and y share the same property (F), the deficit or what remains after the two subtract each other belongs to the universal pre-transference which also gives rise to the subtraction of x and y. For example, what remains after a talk is an impression (conscious or unconscious) from the other speaker, who would have had a similar impression but a processed version via his previous experience. What should be highlighted from the revised formula are relativity (due to personal history), quasi-reflexivity (due to the partial interruption of the other), and mutuality (due to the productivity of the in-betweenness) of the hermeneutic practice. If a sentence could be used to answer the "what's IN the difference" in a general sense, it should be "the ubiquitous chance, a possible field or event, that involves two speakers (not limited to people), to reflect while creating through the exchange of differences. If we should be more specific to enquire "what's IN the difference" in translation and psychoanalysis (both practically and theoretically), it should be "the possibility to continue the interpretation between the translator/psychoanalyst and their counterparts like author/patient, or, if looked from the disciplinary perspective, between translation and psychoanalysis studies.

The article's significance extends beyond its methodological implications for scholars in both translation and psychoanalysis studies because the equation between pre-transference and the difference provides a theoretical entry point and logical ground for scholars to pursue a type of research that involves what underpins people's conscious and unconscious, i. e. the "uncanny relationship" that gives rise to the formation of all humanities and social sciences research. In other words, the article is not probing into the unconscious of neither translators nor texts, but rather the unconscious dynamics of disciplinary discourses and what I would term as hermeneutic practice.

At last, two more scholars should be cited to reimburse the very fundamental vision of the article. Thomas Kuhn's incommensurability (2022) among disciplines itself is the difference or pre-transference, which is the empty gesture of always waiting for the paradigmatic shifts (differences). If there is no commensurability within a specific field of study, how is it possible to crash from another generic ecosystem, including self-sufficient, self-evident, and self-consistent terms, hypotheses, and arguments. Therefore, Kuhn's shifts are the evidence of the innate and empty but ever-present difference which endows the infinite possibilities for the valid existence of shifts to come. If so, the multi-disciplinary development is in dire need of the revised Marx's (2020: 268)

remark from “Workingmen of all countries, unite!” to “Studies of all hermeneutic practice, unite!” for uncovering the invisible hand that drives the constitution of differences we are able to sense and reside in like Heideggerian *Welt*. At least, the future trail engaging translation and psychoanalysis should be blazed on the basis of the relation between the difference and differences, the factors involved in the hermeneutic practice before it actually happens, and the precondition of saying and talking. Such an academic trend on what’s beyond words is well predicted in the poem *Das Wort* by Stefan George:

So lernt ich traurig den Verzicht:
Kein Ding sei wo das Wort gebricht.

[So I renounced and sadly see:
Where word breaks off no thing may be.]

When the word breaks off, or Derrida’s vanishing of the materiality of words, there is no concrete “thing” but an ethereal “field” free for more “breaking off” loops. Departing from this point, I would finally argue that translation and psychoanalysis *were* initially entangled, as quantum physics would predict, given that both strive to break down distinctions. However, after the article’s mediation, it is discovered that they *are* integrating, as they both strive to converge at the pure difference.

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(Editors: Bonnie WANG & Joe ZHANG)